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As a profound challenge to the economic fortunes and development of  London, Brexit is becoming the most discussed topic of the economical world. Recognising this, the UK financial sector campaigned for a Remain vote in the June 2016 EU referendum, and has subsequently lobbied for a “soft” Brexit policy to guarantee continued access to the EU’s single market. Despite this, the newly-formed government led by Theresa May has pursued a “hard” Brexit policy which will see the UK withdraw from both the single market and customs union. This is puzzling because it is potentially highly damaging for the UK national business model, characterised by a large, internationalised and competitive financial sector that is dependent on exports to the EU. (Quaglia, 2019). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

How can we explain the City’s apparent failure to influence the UK’s Brexit policy? We argue that while the UK financial sector continues to wield formidable “latent” structural power, its capacity to translate this into instrumental forms of influence within government has been constrained by three factors. First, the high political salience of Brexit has reduced the effectiveness of City lobbying, which traditionally operates through closed networks of influence. Second, institutional reform within government has challenged the traditional City-Treasury-Bank of England “nexus”, thereby weakening the representation of the City’s interests within government (James, Quaglia, 2017). Third, the City itself is deeply divided on this Brexit issue, constraining the industry’s capacity to organise collectively to influence policy makers.

The decision of the United Kingdom (UK) to leave the European Union (EU) will have significant implications for the British economy and its national business model, characterised by a large, internationalised and competitive financial sector and the status of London as a leading international financial centre (Amable 2003; Hall and Soskice 2002; Schmidt 2002). The City3 – a term used here as shorthand for the financial industry based in the UK – greatly benefitted from financial integration in the EU over recent decades. In fact, in 2016 up to 30% of financial services exports were directed towards the EU27 (the EU minus the UK) and the UK de facto acted as ‘Europe’s investment banker’.

The impact of Brexit, which threatens the financial sector’s access to lucrative EU markets, therefore poses a direct challenge to the interests of the City of London. The literature on varieties of capitalism would predict that the UK should seek to defend its national business model by protecting and promoting the interests of one of its largest and most competitive sectors, namely finance (Fioretos, 2010; Macartney 2010). Similarly, the literature on business power would predict that the City should exert significant influence in the UK policy process, given the substantial dependency of the state on finance and the intense lobbying activities of the industry (Culpepper and Reinke 2014; Culpepper 2015). Furthermore, a distinctive feature of the UK business model in the past was the close nature of business-government relations in finance and the ability of the financial industry to exert political leverage (Baker 1999; Bell and Hindmoor 2015; Hopkins and Shaw 2016). Despite this, the City has been surprisingly ineffective at shaping the UK’s Brexit policy.

It is particularly puzzling that following the EU referendum, Prime Minister Theresa May announced her intention to negotiate a so-called ‘hard’ Brexit that will leave the UK outside the single market and the customs union. This raises two questions. How has the City sought to influence the Brexit policy of the UK government? Why has it not been more successful in doing so? The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we set out to provide an account of the preferences and influence of the UK financial services sector on the Brexit issue. Second, we explain the City of London’s apparent lack of success in shaping the new government’s ‘hard’ Brexit policy. We argue that the City continues to wield formidable ‘latent’ structural power owing to its pre-eminence in the UK economy. Yet its ability to translate this into instrumental forms of influence on Brexit have been constrained by three factors.

First, Brexit is an issue of high political salience. Yet the City is not well-equipped to fight political battles or shape public opinion as it traditionally exerts its influence through the ‘quiet’ politics of closed policy networks. Second, the traditional City-Treasury-Bank of England ‘nexus’ has been weakened by institutional reform within government, driven by the regulatory response to the financial crisis and by the organisation of the Brexit negotiations. Third, the financial industry itself is internally divided on the Brexit issue, limiting its ability to project a powerful collective voice or to strengthen its capacity to lobby policy makers. Contrary to what we would expect from the comparative political economy literature, these three factors have given the May Government significant autonomy from organised financial interests in defining the UK’s Brexit policy. James, Scott, and Lucia Quaglia. Brexit and the Limits of Financial Power in the UK. No. 129. GEG Working Paper, 2017.
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